God’s nature does not make his commands non-arbitrary
Many modern defenders of the divine command theory frequently claim that God’s commands are not arbitrary because they flow from his essential nature. Their argument is bad. That a commander issues...
View ArticleWhy the moral argument fails
Of all the arguments for the existence of God, there is one argument (or one style of argument) that I have never had any sympathy with and never understood why anyone has any sympathy with, and that...
View ArticleLink: “Slavery, Southern Conservatism, and Darwinian Natural Right” by Larry...
“Some of the opponents of Darwinian moral naturalism insist that morality requires a transcendent source in religious belief. But in this debate over slavery, we see that such religious belief–at least...
View ArticleWhat could God’s commands do for morality?
Consider the following version of divine command metaethics (DCM): Our moral obligations are constituted by divine commands. In particular, F is morally obligatory = God has commanded that we F F is...
View ArticleDoes anything really matter?
Does anything really matter? Some people say no. Such people are proponents of nihilism, the view according to which nothing matters. According to nihilists, there is no reason to care about anything...
View ArticleMatthew Flannagan and Jason Thibodeau Discuss the Euthyphro Dilemma
On Saturday (9/22) I was privileged to join Matthew Flannagan for a dialogue about the Euthyphro dilemma. Cameron Bertuzzi of Capturing Christianity hosted the dialogue and livestreamed it from the...
View ArticleThe Euthyphro Dilemma, Part 1: The Question and the Options
The Euthyphro dilemma has been used for centuries as a basis for undermining theories that account for moral value in virtue of God’s will, activities, and/or nature, including various versions of...
View ArticleThe Euthyphro Dilemma, Part 2: Arbitrariness
In the first post in this series, I pointed out that when we apply the Euthyphro question to DCT, we get the following options (I) The reason that God commands that we perform morally obligatory...
View ArticleThe Euthyphro Dilemma, Part 3: Reasons and Moral Obligations
This is the third in a series of posts about the Euthyphro dilemma. In this series, I am making a case that the Euthyphro dilemma provides the basis of a definitive objection to DCT. This case will...
View ArticleThe Euthyphro Dilemma, Part 4: Why is it a dilemma?
In part I of this series, I showed that the Euthyphro dilemma consists of the following two options: (I) The reason that God commands that we perform morally obligatory actions is that they are morally...
View ArticleThe Euthyphro Dilemma, Part 6: Arbitrariness and Normative Impotence
Here, again, are the two options of the Euthyphro dilemma: (I) The reason that God commands that we perform morally obligatory actions is that they are morally obligatory. (II) Morally obligatory...
View ArticleThe Object of Moral Concern Problem for Divine Command Theory
Suppose that I steal your laptop on Friday afternoon. As the weekend sets in, I begin to be plagued by guilt. Initially, taking your laptop seemed like a great idea. I need a new computer, and yours is...
View ArticleVideo: The Euthyphro Problem for Divine Command Theory
This video is based on a presentation that I gave to the Philosophy Club at Glendale Community College (in Glendale Arizona).
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